One of four commentaries from the 16 October 2024 event in the Panel Discussion Series: American Election 2024, from The Finsbury Institute, City International Policy Studies, and the Research Group on Global (Dis)Order.
By Zeno Leonie (KCL)
If one was to ask Chinese strategy-makers what the future of US foreign policy after the 2024 presidential elections is, they would certainly admit that the future is already here. To them, it would not make a substantial difference who wins or loses.
There is some wisdom in this position, in so far as US foreign policy in recent decades has displayed strategic continuity and tactical changes, that is, different ways of achieving the same long-term objectives.
Since the Bush administration, US power has sought to adjust to a liberal international order which was not responding anymore to Washington’s command as it used to. Indeed, it was the war on terror which sparked the very first contributions in a more than two-decade long debate on the crisis of the liberal order – even before discussions about revisionist Russia and China began.
US efforts at making adjustments amidst such crisis of power, continued during the Obama administration, with a geostrategic shift to countering China through his “pivot to Asia” policy. This approach not only has remained unchallenged, but the containment of China has intensified over the years, with Trump pursuing an increase in the absolute numbers of the US navy to compete with the Chinese navy – the biggest in the world – and Biden operating under the assumption that the rivalry with China spans all dimensions of power. A similar pattern – of strategic continuity and tactical change – could be seen on other important issues, from the approach towards Iran and stability in the Middle East at a time of US disengagement, to efforts at resetting the relationship with Russia.
What does this all mean in the context of the forthcoming election? Regardless of who wins, Trump’s and Harris’ position on Ukraine will be influenced by domestic concerns – to an extent – while there is a bipartisan consensus in Washington that China is the priority for the US. Furthermore, recent surveys have shown that China figures prominently as main foreign policy issue among the population. A Trump administration may be less generous to Ukraine, and a Harris one may be more, but in the long-term China will remain the priority in Washington in either case.
The future of US foreign policy is one where Washington will be less engaged in multilateral frameworks and will act more unilaterally. At the same time, alliances will remain central – to an extent: at a time when US influence is declining in the non-western world, Washington’s leverage inside the western world has increased in the aftermath of the world in Ukraine. In this regard, the G7 – which was almost defunct in recent years – has become the primary forum of the west, and as somebody stated, unity of the G7 around Russia, China, Iran is key.
Ultimately, this strategy will involve, on the one hand, preparing to deter China military in the Western Pacific – where Taiwan and the South China Sea lie – while seeking to upgrade the depth of interdependence and interoperability between the US and its closest allies, to selectively decouple such countries’ most sensitive industries – for instance, semiconductors – from China.
About the Author
Dr Zeno Leoni is a Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London, and an Affiliate to the Lau China Institute of the same university. These thoughts have been elaborated with greater depth in the book A New Cold War: US-China Relations In the 21st Century and in a peer-reviewed article on “The return of geopolitical blocs”.